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AMERICA'S SCHIZOPHRENIC
IMMIGRATION POLICY: RACE, CLASS, AND
REASON
CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR. *
Abstract: The historical purpose of American immigration policy was to
provide a haven for those fleeing persecution and those seeking
prosperity, as well as to satisfy workforce and frontier-expansion needs.
However, a survey of U.S. immigration policy reveals that this historical
purpose has been distorted and abandoned, if in fact it ever
represented our nation's goal. This essay evaluates and critiques the
effect that race and politics have had on immigration policy and
enforcement, and on the public opinion that shapes our immigration
priorities. This essay specifically questions whether immigration laws are
equitably applied, without regard to the race or ethnicity of the
immigrant.
Give me your tired, your poor; your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.
—Emma Lazarus'
INTRODUCTION
Emma Lazarus' much-quoted poem, "The New Colossus," brings
to mind a picture of America generously receiving the world's dis-
placed. The premise of the poem is that the United States has a
unique role as a nation open to, and indeed comprised of, immi-
grants—a role that should be celebrated. The recent public outcry
over the return of Cuban-born Elian Gonzalez to Cuba might lead
one to believe that, in some respects, the United States in the twenty-
first century has realized the aspirations articulated in the nineteenth.
Remarkable efforts were made during a seven-month court battle to
* Jesse Climenko Professor of Law, Foimder and Director of the Harvard University
Criminal Justice Institute, sponsor of the Immigration Conference on December
1999. I wish to thank Melanca Clark and Angela Littwin for their tremendous assistance in
providing research for this article, and Matthew Colangelo and Midwin Charles for their
aid during the final stages of this project.
I "The New Colossus," 1883. The poem was inscribed on the base of the Statue of Lib-
erty in 1903.
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keep Elian in the U.S. and to grant him' all the rights and privileges of
American citizenship.
However, a comparison of the treatment accorded to Haitian asy-
lum seekers in the same period demonstrates the need to view the
Elian Gonzalez case within a larger context:
As the whole country and much of the world focuses on one
Cuban boy, Elian Gonzalez, and an international custody
battle that has drawn attention from Attorney General Janet
Reno and President Clinton, some 3,000 Haitians in the
United States face the prospect of leaving their children if
they are deported. 2
Many commentators have noted the disparity between the way Ameri-
can immigration law treats Haitians as compared to Cubans. 3 Illegal
immigrants caught entering the United States generally are returned
to their countries, but under the 1966 Cuban Readjustment Act, all
Cubans who reach U.S. soil are allowed to remain.4 This policy has a
clear racial impact when refugees from Cuba and Haiti are com-
pared—Cuban refugees, most of whom are white, are granted citizen-
ship, while black Haitians are repatriated. In a recent protest of the
treatment of Haitian refugees, the Reverend Jesse Jackson noted that
this situation "reflects racism in U.S. immigration policy that allows
preferential treatment for Cuban refugees but not for those with
darker skin colors from Haiti and elsewhere." 5 As Congressman Char-
les B. Rangel has remarked, "[n)o one challenges the fact that any
other boy who came here illegally from Haiti or the Dominican Re-
public, for example, would have been sent back to their home imme-
diately. But in the Elian case, there was clearly a double standard, be-
2 Rick Bragg, Haitian Immigrants in U.S. Face a Wrenching Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2000, at Al (discussing the disparate treatment of Haitians and Cubans under American
immigration policy).
3 See, e.g., Noah Isackson, Immigration Inequity Cited: Cubans Welcome, Haitians in Limbo,
Jackson Says, CHIC. TRIIL, Apr. 26, 2000, at N3; Christine Evans, Why the World Doesn't Know
about Sophonie, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 23, 2000, at 1A; Haitians Hit U.S. Policy as Unfain
CHIC. TRIB., jail. 16, 2000, at C9; Deborah Sharp, Disparate Rules Stoke Haitian Anger, USA
TODAY, Jan. 14, 2000, at 3A. See generally Malissia Lennox, Note, Refugees, Racism, and Repa-
rations: A Critique of the United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 687 (1993).
4 See Haitians Hit U.S. Policy as Unfair; supra note 3, at C9.
5 Isackson, Immigration Inequity Cited, supra note 3, at N3.
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cause even in our distorted dealings with Cuban refugees, the fact is
Elian is an illegal alien with no legal right to be here." 6
This oft-cited disparity in the treatment of Haitian as compared
to Cuban refugees is not an isolated situation, but rather is an apt il-
lustration of the factors and considerations that inform American
immigration policy as a whole. There is new legislation pending in the
Senate, the proposed Latino and Immigrant Fairness Act, that would
represent at least a step toward establishing parity for Haitian and
Central American immigrants.? As the need for this legislation indi-
cates, however, race and politics continue to play a significant role in
the immigration and refugee policies of the United States, and in the
public opinion that informs those policies.
These issues were the subject of a recent conference on Ameri-
can immigration policy held at the Harvard Law School, jointly spon-
sored by the Harvard Law School Criminal Justice Institute, the Har-
vard Law School Immigration and Refugee Clinic, and the Boston
College Immigration and Asylum Project' Participants explored a
wide range of topics including the human rights implications of U.S.
immigration policies, recent developments in immigration jurispru-
dence, and the intersection of criminal justice and immigration.9
A picture emerged of U.S. policies often informed more by issues
of race than reason, more by politics than principle. This state of af-
fairs has led the ranking member of the House Subcommittee on
Immigration to say:
[I]nnnigration law and immigration policy [reflects] the
confusions and dishonesty and racial attitudes and class atti-
tudes we have in this country in other domestic areas, and I
have found that same kind' of irrational class-based, race-
6 Charles B. Rangel, News Release, Cong. Rangel Joins Republicans in Demanding timings
on Elian Gonzalez (visited Sept. 6, 2000) <http://www.house.gov/opps/list/press/
nyl5_rangel/ chrsupportsgopcallforelianhearings.hunl>,
7 See Latino and Immigrant. Fairness Act of 2000, S. 2912, 106th Cong. (2000). The bill
would, inter alia, allow undocumented Haitians, Hondurans, Guatemalans and Salva-
dorans who fled political violence to obtain legal immigrant status, as Cubans and Nicara-
guans are currently allowed to do. See id. at § 102.
8 United States ha-migration Policy at the Millennium: With Liberty and Justice For All? Har-
vard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. (Dec. 3-5, 1999).
9 Papers presented. at the conference include Daniel Kanstrooni, Deportation, Social
Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About It Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 limn'. L.
REv. 1890 (2000) [hereinafter Kanstrooni, Deportation. Social Control, and Punishment[;
Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of
Proposed Reforms, 113 Ham,. L. REv. 1936 (2000); Gerald L. Neuman, jurisdiction and the
Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963 (2000).
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based kind of thinking existing in our immigration poli-
cies."
This Essay focuses on the impact of race and ethnicity on American
immigration policy.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF RACE AND U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICIES
A. The Legal Climate
America's enthusiasm for newcomers has historically been tem-
pered by its skeptical 'view of outsiders of a different race, ethnicity,
economic status, religion, or political affiliation._ Concerns about job
competition, the burdening of public services and a perceived inabil-
ity of the U.S. easily to absorb cultural outsiders have accompanied
the arrival of immigrants since the eighteenth century."
During the period of American independence, immigrants were
considered to be a vital source for labor, population growth, and de-
fense. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence identified British-
erected barriers to immigration as a major grievance. 12 Even then,
however, many colonists had reservations about what type of immi-
grants were to be admitted and what effect they would have in the de-
velopment of the new polity." In particular, many worried that Catho-
lic and German immigrants would destroy the Anglican nature of the
colonies and corrupt the political process."
Congress began passing substantive laws restricting immigration
in the late nineteenth century. These laws excluded from entry into
the U.S. those who were likely to become a public charge, among
1° Melvin L. Watt, Present and Future of immigration Reform, in 21 IN DEFENSE OF THE
ALIEN 1, 2 (1999).
11 See Maxine S. Seller, Historical Perspectives on American Immigration Policy: Case Studies
and Current Implications, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 137, 138-40 (Richard R. Hofstetter
ed., 1984) (discussing the persistence of arguments used to oppose immigration over
time).
12 "He [The King) has endeavoured to prevent the Population of these States; for that
Purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to
encourage their Migrations hither, and raising the Conditions of new Appropriations of
Lands." Ti E DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776).
" See Seller, supra note 11, at 143.
14 See id. at 142 (citing 3 WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 72 (A. Smyth ed., 1907)
("[IAllty should Palatine Boors be suffered to swarm into our Settlements and, by herding
together, establish their Language and Manners, to the Exclusion of ours? Why should
Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so
numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them?")).
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other restrictions. 15 Wealth-based criteria such as literacy and the
amount of money in an alien's possession became factors to be con-
sidered in determining admissibility.° Ironically, Congress passed this
legislation during the same period in which Americans began to think
of their country as a haven for the poor and oppressed peoples of the
world; a sentiment characterized by the words of Emma Lazarus'
poem—welcoming the Poor and "huddled masses"—inscribed on the
base of the Statue of Liberty. Professor Bill Ong Hing, Executive Di-
rector of the Immigrant Legal Resource Center, has noted that "[l]n
this nation of immigrants, our egalitarian individualism and our
xenophobia are strange bedfellows and may cause considerable slip-
page between the things that we say we are doing and the things that
we "I 7
B. The Changing Political Climate
Personal wealth was not the only criteria used for exclusion at the
end of the nineteenth century. The most pernicious law passed in this
period, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, was aimed at Chinese im-
migrants who had arrived in this country seeking new opportunities
during the Gold Rush, and who were widely employed in the con-
struction of railways in the west. White American laborers who felt
that the Chinese were competing for their jobs increasingly singled
out and vilified these immigrants. The Chinese Exclusion Act effec-
tively barred Chinese immigration, prohibited naturalization for those
already in the country, and provided deportation procedures for ille-
gal immigrants."
From 1880 to 1920 the number of immigrants rose dramatically,
with the countries of origin increasingly concentrated in Eastern and
Southern Europe.° These immigrants faced nativist and xenophobic
16 See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (restricting entrance of destitute per-
sons, criminals, and prostitutes) (repealed 1974); Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Slat, 214,
214 (restricting entrance of those likely to become a public charge) (repealed 1974). See
generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Comely of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
Gown'. L. REV. 1833 (1993) (examining American immigration policy in the late eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries).
16 See Act of Mar. 3, 1893, cll. 206, 27 Stat. 509 (repealed 1952).
17 Bill Ong Hing, Don't Give Me Your Dred, Your Poor: Conflicted Immigrant Stoties and Wel-
fare Reform, 33 LIAM C.R.—C.L. L. Ri:v. 159, 161 (1998).
18 Chinese Exclusion Act of May 0, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
19 See 11.S. DEE'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF TOR IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 15 chat B, 24-25 thl. 2 (1999) [hereinafter 1997 INS STATism
L YEA RBOOK]
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sentiment premised on theories of the racial superiority of Nordic
Europeans." The rapid rise in immigration rates over the previous
generation, combined with the post-World War I political climate, led
to the creation of the "national origins" quota system implemented by
the Immigration Act of 1924. 21 That legislation set quotas for immi-
grants from the eastern hemisphere. 22 Each country was assigned a
portion of the total number of allowable immigrants, fixed in propor-
tion to the national origin of the total U.S. population, by birth or
descent, as reported in the 1920 census. The legislation also
specifically barred virtually all immigration from Asia."
The effect and intent of this policy was to ensure that Northern
and Western Europeans would constitute a greater proportion of im-
migrants at the expense of newer immigrant groups such as Jews, Ital-
ians, Slays, and Greeks. 24 Northern and Western Europeans received
82% of the quota, Southern and Eastern Europeans received 14%,
and the remainder went to the rest of the world. 25 This origins-based
quota system remained in place until its repeal by the Immigration
and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965. 26 This Act, combined with
subsequent legislation, dismantled the national origins quota system
and replaced it with a worldwide quota based on a multi-category visa
preference system. 27
20 See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND 131-57 (1955) (evaluating the contribu-
tions of jingoism, isolationism, and pseudoscientific racial theories of the 1920s to the rise
of an ti-hmnigrant sentiment). See generally Daniel Kanstroom, Dangerous Undertones of the
New Nativism: Peter Brimelow and the Decline of the West, in IMMIGRANTS Our!: THE New NA-
TIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMNIIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 300 ( Juan F. Perea ed.,
1997) (discussing racialist and racist theories prevalent at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, and describing the connection between historical and contemporary anti-immigrant
sentiment); Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment, supra note 8, at 1904-05
("The view of immigration as an ideal shifted dramatically in this coun try as the immigrant
population changed from primarily Northern and Western Europeans to Southern and
Eastern Europeans and Asians.").
21 See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190,43 Stat. 153.
22 See id. The legislation did not set quotas for countries in the western hemisphere. See
id.
23 See id.
21 See generally HIGHAM, supra note 20, at 300-30 (analyzing the history of this legisla-
tion).
25 See PHILLIP Q. YANG, POST-1965 IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES: STRUCTURAL
DETERMINANTS 15 (1995).
26 Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,79 Stat.
911.
27 See id.
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II. THE ROLE OF RACE IN REFUGEE POLICIES
While the dismantling of the quota system removed explicit eth-
nic discrimination from American immigration policy and heralded
an era of liberalization, current immigration policies continue to have
discriminatory effects. It is true that the state of immigration affairs
has come a long way since 1924; in 1997, countries with non-white
populations represented the top five countries of origin of legal MI-
migrants.28 However, implicit and explicit racial biases still pervade all
four major avenues of legal immigration: family-sponsored, employ-
ment-based, diversity and refugee.
The family-sponsored and employment-based immigration rules
appear to be facially neutral, but per-country ceilings and racial biases
in determining eligibility have resulted in fewer immigration visas for
people of color. Country caps are a background provision of the fam-
ily and employment immigration laws. Too many immigrants from
any one country cause the country cap to come into play, and those
applicants over the cap are placed on a waitlist. 29 The same cap ap-
plies to every country regardless of population or the number of peo-
ple who want to immigrate."
In 1997, the only countries affected by the ceilings were Mexico,
India, and the Philippines;31 since 1965, per-country caps have "had
particularly harsh and unintended effects on Mexico and the Philip-
pines."" The main effect of the ceilings is to increase the wait be-
tween application and admission for immigrants from those coun-
tries, sometimes to over ten years. For instance, in 1998 visas were
granted under one of the family preference categories to Mexicans
who had applied in 1986, and to Filipinos who had applied in 1978."
As of January 1997, over one million Mexicans were on visa waiting
lists.M
The visa eligibility process is characterized by extremely broad
administrative discretion, as well as immunity from judicial review,
2 See 1997 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 19, at 20 OA C. The top five coun-
tries in 1997 were, in order: Mexico, the Philippines, China, Vietnam and India. See id.
79 See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF El' AL., IMMIGRATION S.: CITIZENSHIP PROCESS
AND POLICY 295 (4111 ed. 1998). These caps do not affect immediate relatives of U.S. citi-
zens. See id.
The annual per-country ceiling is established through a complicated "piercing" sys-
tem. See id. at 292-96.
31- U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF 'HIE VISA OFFICE 1997 5 (1998).
32 ALEINIKOFF, supra note 29, at 295.
33 See id. at 296 (citing U.S. DEFT 01: STATE, VISA BULLETIN (Feb, 1998)).
m See id. at 295.
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which makes the process susceptible to racial discrepancies and bi-
ases. In a 1991 study of visa denials at U.S. consular offices, James Naf-
ziger found considerable variation among acceptance rates in offices
in different countries." The highest acceptance rates were in Japan
with 99.7%, while consular offices in Mexico accepted between 55%
and 84% of applicants. 38 Nafziger speculated that the wide range of
acceptance rates across Mexican offices might be due to "demo-
graphic rather than administrative factors":"
The more prosperous and "professional" areas, such as
Hermosillo and Mexico City, where trade and investment
representatives and the intelligentsia tend to be concen-
trated, have higher rates of visa acceptances. Conversely, a
higher rate of applications at the other posts came from
poor, rural backgrounds. 38
Some consular offices have used openly racist criteria in visa deci-
sions. In Olsen u Albright, a consular officer stationed in Brazil sued
the State Department because he was fired for refusing to follow the
consulate's racial visa eligibility policies." The manual he refused to
follow established fraud profiles which were based on factors such as
race and national origin.° The manual instructed consular officers to
scrutinize Korean and Chinese applicants for fraud and declared any-
one from certain predominately black cities "suspect unless older,
well-traveled, etc."41 The consular section head had further stated that
"Filipinos and Nigerians have high fraud rates, and their applications
should be viewed with extreme suspicion, while British and Japanese
citizens rarely overstay, and generally require less scrutiny."42
" SeeJames A. R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 WASH. L. Ray. I,
69 (1991).
36 See id.
57 Id. at 70.
38 Id. Nafziger qualifies this observation by stating; "This, however, is all very impres-
sionistic and speculative. More comprehensive figures from the field merit further analy-
sis." Id.
" 990 F. Stipp. 31, 32-33 (D.D.C. 1997). This case involved nonimmigrant rather than
immigrant visas. See id. at 33. However, because a high percentage of illegal immigrants are
visa overstayers, and many nonimmigrant visitors legally immigrate during their stay, non-
immigrant visas affect who is able to immigrate to the United Slates. See, e.g., Bill Ong
Fling, Immigration Policies: Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37 How. L.J. 237, 243
(1994) thereinafter fling, Immigration Policies].
4° See Olsen, 990 F. Supp. at 33.
41 Id, (quotations omitted).
44 Id. at 34.
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The so-called "public charge" ineligibility criterion, allowing visa
denials where there is a likelihood that an immigrant will require pub-
lic assistance, has been particularly subject to racial and ethnic stereo-
typing. This too is an area in which there is no judicial review. In 1978,
a consular discretion study found that 61% of Mexican immigrant visa
refusals were for public charge, while the criterion accounted for only
11% of Canadian visa refusals." When interviewed, some consular
officers openly admitted to using racial criteria:
A number of. consular officers think that certain ethnic
groups are more likely to go on welfare than others. One
officer believe[d] that Canadians, Haitians, and Portuguese
are not as likely to go on welfare as Latin Americans. An- .
other officer stated that Chinese will not go on welfare . . . .
Thus, he views Chinese with less suspicion than other groups
under the public charge provision."
The susceptibility of the public charge determination to racial stereo-
typing is particularly troublesome given that it is by far the primary
reason for visa rejection. In 1997, public charge represented 76% of
initial visa refusals; the next highest ineligibility category, ineffective
labor certification, represented less than 12% of rejections." The im-
pact of the public charge category is only likely to increase—since
August 1997, family sponsors have been required to show that their
income is 25% above the poverty line, instead of the previous re-
quirement of being level with the poverty line, in order to avoid the
public charge criterion."
Unlike the family-sponsored and employment-based categories,
the diversity visa system as originally established was openly based on
ethnic criteria. The original intent of the diversity visa lottery was to
benefit certain European groups. 47 When Congress made diversity
immigration a separate category under the 1986 Immigration Reform
and Control Act, it "sought to ameliorate the steep reduction in
European migration that—according to the prevailing view—had
43 See Kim R. Anderson & David A. Gifford, Consular Discretion in the Immigrant Visa-
Issuing Process, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 87, 113-14 (1978).
44 Id. at 12311.250.
45 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SUPta note 31, at 14&-47 OA. XX. This figure does not in-
clude rejections based upon improperly completed applications. See id.
46 Lynn 1-1. Fujiwara, The Impact of Welfare Reform on Asian Immigrant Communities, 25
Soc. Psi'. 82 (1998).
47 Cf. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 29, at 291.
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been an unexpected byproduct of the 1965 amendments." 48 Congress
created a list of thirty-six countries whose nationals could participate
in the lottery—a list that was disproportionately European. 49 Al-
though the current criteria applied to countries in the diversity cate-
gory is based on a perceived under-representation in the other immi-
gration categories, Europeans are still the primary beneficiaries.
During 1998, European countries had by far the greatest number of
diversity immigrants admitted5°
According to the State Department, Congress established this
category to promote European and African immigration. 51 However,
reviews of the benefits of the diversity legislation to would-be African
immigrants have been mixed.52 Because the original 1986 bill only
benefited countries whose number of immigrants dropped following
the 1965 legislation, no African countries were eligible. It was only
under criteria added in 1998 that a substantial number of African
countries qualified, and then over three million people applied for
only 20,000 slots." The program presents additional barriers for so-
cioeconomically disadvantaged Africans, by requiring a high-school
education or qualifying trade skills. 54
The diversity immigration system can be viewed as the most re-
cent version of the long line of immigration legislation designed to
make "the proportions of immigrants who are ethnically similar to the
then existing United States population higher than the percentages
that either unrestricted immigration or country-neutral immigration
criteria would have produced." 55 Historically, as now, the effects were
intended. 56 The ethnic disparities of the program are borne by the
countries with the longest waitlists already, since nationals from those
countries are, by definition, not eligible. Because diversity hnmigra-
48 Id.
49 See id.
5° See id. at 292 (citing U.S. DEPT OF STATE, DIVERSITY IMMIGRANT VISA LOTTERY
(DV-98) RESULTS (Sept. 10, 1997)). In 1998, the United StateS issued 23,213 diversity visas
to citizens of Europeans countries, as compared to 21,179 visas issued to citizens of African
countries, 7,280 visas issued to citizens of Asian countries, and 2,476 visas issued to citizens
of Caribbean and South and Central Americans countries. See id,
51 See U.S. DEPT OF STATE, supra note 31, at 6.
52 See Fling, Iminigration Policies, supra note 39, at 260.
83 See id.
51 See id. at 261.
55 Stephen FL Legomsky, Immigration, Equality and Diversity, 31 Comm. J. TRANSNAV
L. 319, 330 {1993).
56 See id. at 326-30 (demonstrating the racial basis for promoting European immigra-
tion).
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Lion is the only category not tied to any specific criteria, these exclu-
sions make it nearly impossible for unskilled Mexicans and Filipinos,
who don't have family members in the U.S., to immigrate legally.
III. REFUGEES
Understandably, no country is capable of absorbing all of the
world's refugees. 57 While choices must be made about the appropriate
criteria to use for admission, American refugee policy—as with the
family-sponsored, employment-based, and diversity visa systems—is
informed by political considerations and racial bias.
Congress first enacted comprehensive refugee legislation in
1980, 58 Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980 (the "Refugee Act"), the ma-
jority of refugees had been admitted into the United States under ad
hoc legislation created to deal with particular world crises as they
arose. Decisions were invariably influenced by American foreign pol-
icy objectives and concerns. Those aliens who were fleeing from
Communist governments and other countries unfriendly to the U.S.
were disproportionately granted asylum or, refugee status. 59 For ex-
ample, under the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act Amend-
ments, one of the three enumerated mechanisms for providing refu-
gee treatment for aliens was expressly limited to those fleeing
persecution from "Communist-dominated" and Middle Eastern coun-
tries.60
In 1980, the United States overhauled its refugee policies and
attempted to bring them into conformity with the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Protocol"). The
United States had been a signatory to the Protocol since 1968 but had
been resistant to making major changes in domestic immigration law
in order to come into compliance with the Protocol, Among the
changes included in the Refugee Act was the institution of a "credible
fear" standard, requiring that asylum seekers show a "well-founded
57 Refugees are defined as aliens who are outside of the U.S. and who cannot return to
their country of nationality because of a well-founded fear of persecution. See Refugee Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998)). Asylees are those aliens who are already inside American borders. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (1994).
55 See Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 57.
59 Seel Michael Cavosie, Note, Defending the Golden Door: The Persistence of Ad Hoc and
Ideological Decision Making in U.S. Refugee Law, 67 IND. L.J. 411, 412 (1992).
00 Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments, supra note 26.
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fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion." 61
The new legislation eliminated language specifying any ideologi- e
cal or geographical preference for admitting refugees. The Refugee
Act did, however, provide for the President to make an annual deter-
mination, subject to consultation with Congress, of the number of
refugees to be admitted and the percentage to be allotted to each
country. 62 This discretion allows ideological and geographical biases
to continue to impact the refugee system.
Furthermore, legislation passed subsequent to the Refugee Act
has served to reintroduce an ideological and geographical preference
system for refugees. The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1990 relaxed the refugee
standard for selected aliens.63 The legislation substituted the "well-
founded fear" standard of persecution with a less stringent "credible
basis for concern" standard for Soviet Jews, Evangelical Christians,
Ukrainian Catholic or Orthodox Church members, and selected
Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians. 64
An examination of the refugee admissions authorized by Ameri-
can presidents between 1980 and 1997 reveals that "[i]n every year
from [the Refugee Act's] adoption until the collapse of Communism,
Presidents allocated almost the entire refugee quota to those who
were fleeing communist countries (or other United States adversaries,
such as Iran)."65 The numbers also show that the decline of Commu-
nism among the world's governments has been accompanied by a re-
duction in the overall refugee quota 6 6
A number of legal actions have challenged the government's dis-
criminatory behavior in refugee status determinations. In Orantes-
Hernandez v. Thornburgh, a class of Salvadoran citizens won an injunc-
tion prohibiting the INS from encouraging the abandonment of
claims for asylum. 67 Similarly, in American Baptist Churches v. Thorn-
burgh, a class of Salvadorans and Guatemalans brought suit against the
INS alleging discrimination in the adjudication of asylum and depor-
61 Refugee Act of 1980, suin-a note 57.
62 See at.
63 P111). L. No. 101-167,103 Stat. 1195 (1989).
" See Cavosie, supra note 59, at 431-32.
63 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 763 (2d. ed.
1997) (citing 55 Fed. keg. 41,979-80 (Oct. 17, 1991)).
66 See id. at 764.
67 See 919 F.2d 549, 554-55, 567-68 (9i1i Cir. 1990).
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tation claims, and succeeded in forcing a favorable settlement agree-
ment.68
Although refugees have enjoyed some success in challenging dis-
criminatory practices, refugee policy has been adversely affected by
other recent judicial developments. In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
the Supreme Court held that Haitian asylum-seekers could be sum-
marily returned to .Haiti because they were intercepted on the high
seas, and consequently were not subject to existing protections against
forcible repatriation without screening for a well-founded fear of per-
secution.69 Such a technical interpretation of American obligations to
refugees is troubling in that it enables the INS to make calculated de-
terminations to deny refugee status irrespective of the merits of a
given claim. One commentator notes that "Sale communicates an atti-
tude of calculated cynicism toward international obligation, which in
the long run may prove its most destructive legacy. "70
IV. RACIAL POLITICS AND IMMIGRATION PRACTICES
In addition to the disparate racial impact of legal immigration
categories, the enforcement of immigration laws and the treatment of
illegal aliens is also skewed along racial lines. An analysis of INS en-
forcement activity and resource allocation shows a disproportionate
focus on illegal immigrants from Latin American countries.
Illegal immigrants make up less than 2% of the national popula-
tion, with the vast majority concentrated in just a few states." While
the stereotypical image of an illegal immigrant is of a Latino crossing
the U.S. border at night, more than 40% of illegal immigrants are ac-
tually people who entered the country legally but overstayed their vi-
sas. 72 Mexico does consistently supply more illegal immigrants than
68 See 760 F. Supp. 796, 797-800 (N.D. Cal. 1991); we also Haitian Refugee Center v.
Smith, 676 F. 2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that expedited administrative procedures
used by immigration officials in asylum adjudication of Haitians were discriminatory and
violated Haitians' due process rights). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial Arquiescence to
the Executive Branch's Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic Agendas in Immigration Matters: The
Case of the Haitian Asylum-Seekers, 7 GEO. Murat. L.J. 1 (1993).
69 509 U.S. 155, 158-59 (1995).
" Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Wage Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 1, 10 (1997).
71 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Illegal Alien Resident
Population, (last modified Aug. 11, 1999) Chttp://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/
statistics/illegalalien/index.hun>. The seven states with the largest populations of illegal
aliens—California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, and Arizona—make up
83% of the total number of illegal immigrants. See id.
72 See id.
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any other country, but recent figures show Canada and Poland to be
the fourth and fifth most common source countries, respectively. 73
These figures challenge the notion that illegal immigrants are all of a
certain ethnic group or that they all enter the country in the same
way.
In spite of this varied picture of the sources and methods of ille-
gal immigration, a vastly disproportionate amount of enforcement
activity is directed at Latin Americans generally, and Mexicans in par-
ticular. While not all of the top five source countries for illegal immi-
grants are in Latin America, the top five countries of citizenship for
deported illegal aliens are all Latin American countries. 74 Enforcing
American immigration policy usually means patrolling the U.S.-
Mexico border, and Latin Americans bear the brunt of this tactic. The
United States spends 85% of its anti-illegal immigration resources on
border control, 75 and southwest border enforcement accounted for
89% of what the INS terms "deportable aliens located" in 1997. 76
Only four in ten illegal immigrants, however, enters the United
States through the Mexican border. 77 Though estimates of the per-
centage of illegal immigrants from Mexico range from 39% to 54%, 78
over 90% of illegal immigrants apprehended are Mexican. 79 The deci-
sion to place higher priority on border interdiction than on locating
and deporting visa overstayers further magnifies the disparate treat-
ment of Mexican and Central American illegal immigrants. Visa over-
stayers make up just 16% of Mexican and 26% of Central American
illegal immigrants, but they constitute 91% of the illegal population
73 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1994 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 197 thl. N (1996); but see 1997 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra
note 19, at 200 (showing Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Canada and 1-laiti as the top five
source countries for illegal immigrants, with Poland ranking tenth).
74 See U.S. Dep't of justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Country of Origin
(last modified Mar. 7, 2000) <hup://www.ins.usdoj.govigraphics/alioutins/statistics/
299.hun>. Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Canada and Haiti were the top five source
countries of illegal immigrant population, while illegal immigrants from Mexico, El Salva-
dor, Honduras, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic were the top five groups appre-
hended by immigration officials. See id.
" See Nic Paget-Clarke, The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border: Interview with Maria
Jimenez, IN MOTION MAGAZINE, Feb, 2, 1998, available at Chttp://www. inmotionmaga-
zitte.com/tnjl.html >.
76 1997 INS STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 19, at 173.
77 See MICHAEL FIX & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS: SETTING THE
RECORD STRAIGHT 25 (1994).
78 See id. (estimating that 39% of illegal immigrants are from Mexico); 1997 INS STA-
TISTICAL YEARBOOK at 200 (estimating that 54% of illegal immigrants are from Mexico).
" See Paget-Clarke, supra note 75.
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from the rest of the world.80 This prioritization has only become more
pronounced in recent years; since 1994, there has been a 122% in-
crease in Border Patrol agents, and two thousand immigration inspec-
tors have been added. 81
There is further evidence that border enforcement is applied se-
lectively. In a comparison of America's two border states, INS statistics
for 1996 suggest that the Border Patrol apprehends about 91% of
Mexican illegal immigrants but only 28% of illegal Canadian immi-
grants. 82 These figures demonstrate that even within a policy context
that prioritizes border enforcement, that enforcement is applied se-
lectively, with greater resources and effort being expended to patrol
the Mexican border.
Once inside the country, Latinos are systematically and dispro-
portionately targeted for deportation. For instance, the INS began its
plan to increase immigration enforcement in the country's interior
with Operation Vanguard, targeting the Nebraska meat-packing in-
dustry; up to 90% of workers in the meat-packing industry are La-
tino.83 While the INS claimed that Operation Vanguard was motivated
not by race but by the historically high rates of illegal immigrant em-
ployment in the meat-packing industry, the actions and attitudes of
INS agents in many other cases betray the existence of an institutional
bias.84 One stark example occurred when the INS pulled over the
mayor of Pomona, California, Eddie Cortez, and questioned him
about his immigration status. As Cortez described the event: "(The
agent) said, 'Identify yourself, or else I will put you in the van with the
rest of them.' Twice, I ignored their request for identification. I
wanted a reason. If I did not break a law, why were they stopping
8° See U.S. Dept of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Illegal Alien Re,si-
detd Population (last modified Aug. 11, 1999) Chttp://www.ins.usdoigov/graphics/about-
ins/statistics/illegalalien/index.hun >.
81 See Thaddeus Herrick, Reno Urges Putting Brake on Border Patrol Buildup, HOUS.
CHRON., Mar. 10, 1999, at Al.
82 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Country of Origin, supra note 74. The percentages are calcu-
lated using INS figures for the number of aliens apprehended in 1996 and estimates for
the number of illegal immigrants who manage to enter and remain in the country annu-
ally. Note that even though the rate of apprehension is much higher for Mexicans, in abso-
lute numbers there are far more Mexicans than Canadians entering each year. A 91% ap-
prehension rate for illegal Mexican immigrants misses an estimated 154,000 illegal aliens,
while the 28% apprehension rate for Canadians only results in an estimated 8,000 entering
the country illegally. See id,
81 See David LaGesse, Social Security Officials Halt INS Program in Meatpacking Industry,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 13, 1999, at. SA.
84 See id.
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ine?"85 These incidents demonstrate the role that racial politics play in
immigration practices, and especially in anti-illegal immigration con-
trol.
CONCLUSION
The treatment of refugees from unpopular countries such as
Mexico and Haiti, when compared to the treatment of Elian Gonzalez
and immigrants from favored countries, confirms that our immigra-
tion policies are based on race rather than reason, and begs the ques-
tion whether fairness is the operating principle of American immigra-
tion policies. While the state of immigration policies in the United
States has come a long way since the implementation of the national
origins quota system in 1924, it is evident that racial biases still per-
vade the major avenues of legal immigration. As a nation founded by
and comprised of immigrants, America must maintain its openness to
immigrants and its commitment to the equitable application of immi-
gration law. The nineteenth century American aspiration to be a ha-
ven for the tired, the poor, and the huddled masses must become a
realization, not just for those seeking refuge from favorable countries,
but for all.
85 Lee Romney, Over The Line? Citing Questioning of Maya;; Activists Say Border Patrol Tar-
gets All Latinos, L.A. TustEs, Sept. 2, 1993, at ,J 1.
